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De-Stalinization was a particularly significant process during the era following Stalin’s 
death. It impacted and changed just about every aspect of life. The methods used to put 
political policy into practice, the priorities of economic and social policies and of cultural 
life, together with the relationship between the ruling forces and the public all underwent 
changes.  The goal continued to be the building of socialism and, in the final analysis, of 
communism, albeit, not a single party including the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) had 
given any precise definition of these concepts, or, most importantly, what it would take for 
these goals to be reached. They held onto the Marxian definition as redefined by Stalin, that 
socialism was a condition under which the principle of “each according to his ability, each 
according to his work” would be valid. This meant that there would be no coercion to work 
but that the demands of the individual could not yet be satisfied. This tenet was stated in the 
1936 Stalin constitution.
2
  The structure of communism, for which Marx’s original definition: 
“each according to his ability, each according to his needs,” was accepted, was envisioned 
for sometime in the distant future.
3
 This Stalinist “definition of socialism” – which Marx 
never used – became a tent of the East European countries after 1947. However, the decades 
old question that remained unanswered, even in the post-Stalin world was: how does one get 
to “socialism,” and, will “socialism” be the same for every country? 
The main characteristics of the Stalinism, in part imported into the region after 1947, and 
in part coming from within were: the practice of forced industrialization (particularly with 
regard to manufacture of the means of production), and the transformation of agriculture on 
the basis of the logic of the class struggle. This latter did not mean increasing output or 
modernization but the liquidation of certain social classes (large estate owners, rich landed 
farmers), and the introduction of one-person government based on the personality cult 
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combined with unbridled terror. That was the Soviet form of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 
Another Stalin legacy was the huge empire created by the Stalinization of the East 
European countries, in which the leading role of the USSR was incontestable.  In this camp 
every single country was strictly dependent on Moscow and trusted in Moscow. All were 
subordinate to the camp center and horizontal relations with one another were either non-
existent or formal.
4
 
De-Stalinization resulted in two decisive changes. They were closely connected; 
nevertheless they were contradictory to a certain degree. One aspect of de-Stalinization 
affected the domestic policies of several of the socialist countries. The process got underway 
in 1953 but it was 1955-1956 before the Soviet leadership officially announced the doctrine 
that every country had the right to set its own course on the way to socialism.
5
 This was also 
an admission that the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and adherence to the Soviet model had 
not brought the East European countries any closer to “socialism,” but quite the contrary, had 
brought about declines from what had been their previous development levels. This meant 
taking a step backwards and re-thinking how the goal could be otherwise achieved. The other 
outcome of de-Stalinization was that “with the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) (in 1956), the officially confirmed the policy of “peaceful coexistence” 
was given new content. In essence, Khrushchev took the 1924 Stalin tenet, that socialism 
must be built in a single country because the flames of revolution had died out in Europe, and 
applied it to the whole socialist camp. In other words, he admitted that the socialist camp 
would not be expanding within the foreseeable future and was forced to accept the existence 
of two camps. From this point on, the primary goal of the Soviet Union was to get its own 
system of alliance, the Warsaw Pact, recognized as equal to NATO. To put it another way, it 
was pushing the capitalist world to recognize the existence and the right to exist of the 
socialist one.
6
 They justified the correctness of “peaceful coexistence” – as opposed to the 
previous war psychosis – with their belief in the superiority of socialism. Sooner or later the 
forces of socialism will be victorious over capitalism in peaceful competition and therefore 
no new world war was needed. 
However, attainment of this goal required unity within the camp and for this very reason 
Moscow was forced to make concessions. The “rehabilitation” of Yugoslavia, meaning its 
recognition, once again, as a country that was building socialism, was tantamount to 
acknowledging that there were different roads leading to socialism. And that was the first 
sign of the tension between the “separate roads” and the need to sustain unity. The Yugoslav 
road resulted in a model that was different from the Soviet one. However, Khrushchev was 
definitely not about to let the other East European countries choose any model but the Soviet 
one. In fact, much as Stalin had done in the late 1930s, Khrushchev declared the legitimacy 
of the existing “Soviet System” on the grounds of necessity, stating that this was the only 
form able to protect socialism from the capitalist world. That doctrine was a real snag in the 
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works, preventing the separate ways from evolving at the outset, or more precisely, allowing 
them some latitude but not enough to try out a different model. 
In addition, allowing socialism to be build on a road paved with national specifics ran 
the hazard of ending up with an outcome differing from the “Soviet model,” which meant 
that the country might want an independent foreign policy. To make things worse, if a 
significant portion of that autonomous foreign policy was the outcome of domestic policy, it 
would mean that different domestic policy roads begat different foreign policies which might 
then violate the interests of other countries in the camp. So, the question was reduced to the 
extent to which the countries of the region influenced one another, meaning to what degree 
did they get in the way of or perhaps assist another country in achieving its goal. Might we 
then speak of a close alliance or of separatist movements?  To make a long story short, de-
Stalinization had a significant effect on relationships within the Stalinist empire.  
De-Stalinization raised the issue of both means and end: What kind of socialism might 
be implemented on what road, and what tactic would lead to what outcome? There were 
already two models: the Soviet and the Yugoslav. Which would the other countries follow 
and how? On ideological level the question was formulated as whether the “Soviet system” 
was the only way to achieve socialism, or were different frameworks also feasible? 
 
Seeking “national roads:” the “new phase” policy (1953-1955) 
 
There were any number of factors, external and internal, that suggested the possibility of 
recognizing different roads leading to socialism based on national specifics, and pulling away 
from the “Stalinist method.” The most attractive of these offered the chance to abandon 
policies that gave priority to forced industrialization and conducted an undifferentiated rural 
class struggle, and which made it possible to renounce overt terrorism. Factors indicating that 
terror was indeed declining included a Soviet amnesty decree (March 27, 1953), a halt to a 
Soviet purge of doctors (April 4, 1953), the arrest of Soviet interior minister Lavrentiy Beria 
(June 27,1953) selection of Nikita Khrushchev as CPSU first secretary, and the start of the 
rehabilitation process. A front page article in Pravda (May 24, 1953) on “the current 
international situation” suggested that economic policy priorities were being revisited. “No 
matter how different the social systems of the different countries may be, the interests of the 
peoples of these countries coincide on numerous vital points. These vital points include peace 
and the advancement of commercial, economic, and cultural cooperation among the people.” 
With the conclusion of the Korean War (June 27, 1953) the war psychosis also ended. That 
made it possible to slow down war industry, meaning heavy industry, investments and to 
regroup investment priorities. The latter was very necessary since the East Berlin uprising 
(June 17, 1953) and workers’ insurrections in Plzeň (May 30 to June 3, 1953) pointed to 
problems with living standards among the populace. 
The internal factors of the given countries also had significant effects on the shape of the 
evolving de-Stalinization processes. The character and depth of Stalinism and the way it had 
come about were decisive. Discussions on the “roads to socialism” did not post-date Stalin’s 
death but began much earlier, before adopting the Soviet model and the establishment of 
Cominform.
7
 Therefore, the rehabilitation of the pre-1947 roads was as important – at least in 
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part – as was protection of the outcomes of the post-1947 policy. At the same time, the 
people representing the “national road” concept in the de-Stalinization process and their 
earlier relationship to Stalinism were also significant. The fact is that there are always people 
behind the structures and people are the ones who alter those structures. 
In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party, headed by Klement Gottwald and Rudolf 
Slánský were essentially successful in implementing the “Czechoslovak road” concept.8 The 
turnabout (communist takeover) of February 1948 took place amidst the “limited democracy” 
that had existed between 1945 and 1948. The essence of the “Czechoslovak road” was that 
after an election won by the communists (1946) it executed a power takeover based on 
existing political mechanisms because of the splits and weaknesses in the “democratic 
forces,” and because it was able to take advantage of their political failings. Another specific 
of Czechoslovakia was that the entire shift took place independently, without the presence of 
Soviet troops, relying essentially on the support or passivity of the public.
9
 Following 1948 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC) maintained the political structure it had 
evolved between 1945 and 1948, at least on the surface. It retained a semblance of a multi-
party system (although all the Slovak parties were liquidated and the social democrats were 
“merged” into the communist party) but this was no longer real pluralism. The measures 
were intended to sustain an image of democracy towards the outside world.
10
 
The “Czechoslovak road” to socialism assumed that in an industrially developed country 
with a measure of democratic tradition, it would be possible to shift to a people’s democracy 
through “peaceful means” and through that to socialism. This historical experience played a 
significant role in Czechoslovakia’s process of de-Stalinization, too. The debates in 
Czechoslovakia following Stalin’s death were not around the extent to which it was 
necessary to deviate from “the Soviet model,” or whether it would be possible to reach 
socialism along separate roads. The Czechoslovak debates were exactly the opposite – the 
Communist Party leaders argued that they had been on a separate road since the outset, 
following the path set by Klement Gottwald, and were very close to their objective.
11
 For this 
reason, when Gottwald died just a few days after Stalin’s funeral, he could not be used as the 
target of critique against Stalinism. Gottwald personified the “Czechoslovak road,” and thus, 
the personality cult surrounding him which grew even stronger after his death, was closely 
linked with the essential issues of socialism in Czechoslovakia.
12
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At the same time, Gottwald’s death brought about a leadership crisis in Czechoslovakia. 
Gottwald had been both president of Czechoslovakia and president (předseda) of the party. 
As president of the country, he was succeeded by Antonín Zápotocký, but there was no one 
in the party with anything like Gottwald’s prestige, so they simply eliminated the position of 
party president. It took until September 1953 before the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia officially elected Antonín Novotný as the party’s first 
secretary. 
13
 In other words, power was divided, for in Czechoslovakia the head of state was a 
traditionally powerful position. Even though its authorities had been chipped away by the 
constitution of 1948, it remained highly significant in the eyes of the public. 
The leadership crisis was compounded by economic difficulties. Exaggerated 
industrialization and huge investments for arms production meant that the public and in 
particular the blue-collar workers, had significant cash reserves while neglect of agriculture 
meant that the amount of available consumer goods was far less than demand. Therefore, a 
plenary session of the National Assembly, meeting on May 30, 1953, adopted a monetary 
reform and the termination of ration coupons for food and manufactured goods. The crown 
was shifted to a gold standard and the old currency was replaced with new bills. The 
monetary exchange from old to new was pocket-gouging for the public, but that was the 
purpose of the move. The government wanted to reduce the cash reserves of the populace. 
The unfavorable exchange rate triggered social dissatisfaction and the blue-collar workers 
went out on strike. The most significant protest was organized by the workers at the Skoda 
factory in Plzen. Official forces used singular brutality to break it. But a lesson was learned. 
In early August, speaking at a barrage construction site in Klíčava, near Kladno, Zápotocký 
condemned forceful collectivization and promised farmers that they would be allowed to 
leave the collective farms. At the same time, the party’s Central Committee met and passed a 
resolution to allow intra-party democracy, to end purges, to restore the role of the bodies of 
popular representation and to reduce the forced rate of industrialization. Responding to 
pressure from Moscow, they adopted the “August thesis’s” which were the first time they 
spoke of the serious economic mistakes they had made. However, they did not make the 
theorems public.
14
  A month later, a new Central Committee meeting proclaimed a “new 
phase,” which promised to cut the industrialization rate, maintain party democracy and re-
visit show-trial convictions. 
The “new phase” policies were interrupted by secret Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations 
in Moscow in April 1954. Khrushchev criticized Zápotocký even though he thought the latter 
was right on agricultural issues. Eventually, Novotný was able to overcome Khrushchev’s 
objections. But Zápotocký’s position weakened and Novotný’s grew stronger15 amidst a 
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slowdown in the “new phase” policies. The end to this early phase of Czechoslovak de-
Stalinization was signaled on February 11, 1955, in an address Novotný presented to a 
plenary session of the Central Committee and when a resolution was adopted to accelerate 
and complete the collectivization of agriculture. Granted, the political line was not a return to 
the Stalinist concept which treated collectivization exclusively as a class-struggle issue. 
However, it did state that one reason for the slowdown in collectivization was 
“underestimation of the class struggle in the villages” which had led to insufficient measures 
against the wealthy farmers (kulaks). At the same time, it pointed to the importance of 
agricultural modernization and improving the productivity level. It stated that collectivization 
would require advances in mechanization, construction of common barns and stables as well 
as other outbuildings, and political and professional advances in agricultural leaders.
16
 
Hungary was the place where, a few months after Stalin’s death, the most spectacular de-
Stalinization measure was taken. Ironically, Stalinist methods were used to bring it about, for 
it involved direct Soviet intervention, but it put Imre Nagy into the prime ministership.  
Earlier Nagy had been severely criticized and stripped of his leadership position precisely 
because of his “separate roads” policies.17 A Hungarian party and government delegation 
held talks in Moscow on June 13-16, 1953, where the Soviet leadership harshly criticized 
Rákosi for exaggerated industrialization, over-building the armed forces, coerced agricultural 
collectivization, supply problems, a decline in living standards, and the personality cult.  The 
Moscow critique was followed by the changes. A meeting of the Central Committee of the 
Hungarian Working People’s Party (HWPP) on June 27-28 exposed “the mistakes made 
while building socialism” and the reasons behind them, and it set down new party guidelines 
(“the June resolutions”).  The Central Committee essentially adopted Moscow’s critique, 
turning it into a resolution and even went so far as to declare that the economic policy 
guidelines adopted by the 2nd congress of the HWPP (1951) were faulty. A step (backwards) 
this radical had not taken place up until then in either Czechoslovakia or Poland. After the 
Central Committee re-visited the views of Imre Nagy on rural policy which had once been 
condemned (on September 3, 1949) it promised that a fundamental change would take place 
in economic policy, would allow the collective farms to de-collectivize and would terminate 
the categorization of rich farmers (kulaks) as enemies.
18
 However, the direct Soviet 
intervention yielded ambiguous results. It established a dual management system leaving 
Rákosi, who had been responsible for the faulty policy up till then, at the head of the party 
while reinforcing the role of the new Nagy government tasked in implementing the “new 
phase” policy. This duality had multiple pitfalls, leading to disputes over competency, and 
eventually to the failure of the “new phase” policy itself. 
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Hungary’s situation was also unique in that the Hungarian communist party had not had 
an “own Hungarian way” concept prior to the advent of Stalinism, so there was nothing to 
revive after Stalin’s death. In 1943 the communist party, which had been operating 
underground within Hungary, was dissolved, so the leadership of the communist party after 
1945 acted as a complete minion to Soviet political will. One excellent example of this came 
in 1948 when the Kremlin changed its attitude towards Yugoslavia. The Hungarian 
communist party was the first to wave the Soviet party’s banner even though it had 
maintained a good relationship with the Yugoslav communists up until them, with Tito being 
highly popular among the Hungarian public.
19
 (Poland, for instance, was quite laid back in its 
participation in the anti Tito campaign.) We can also qualify it as a Hungarian specific that 
when the first free elections were held (1945), the right-center won, with the communists and 
social democrats combined winning fewer seats than the Independent Smallholders’ Party. 
Another sign of just how weak the communists were is that in the 1947 elections they only 
managed to win 22.25 percent of the votes. This is one reason why the Hungarian communist 
party did not design a “Hungarian road,” for the only way it could effect a takeover was with 
help from the USSR. At the same time, choosing Imre Nagy – whether they knew it or not – 
was taking a politician who did have his own views on building socialism in Hungary, even 
if the ideas had not crystallized into a “separate road” concept, and placing him at the helm of 
government. Nagy, as opposed to Novotný, was not a simple apparatchik who had clawed his 
way the top, but a person with a talent for, and interest in, theoretical issues. Regarding 
collectivization, even before 1948-1949 he had argued adamantly that it could not be done 
quickly or through coercion. He did not question the final objective but did object to the 
Stalinist road. He was similarly attracted to the ideals of direct democracy which began to 
take shape spontaneously in Hungary in 1945. Although its form may not have been the 
same, the revival of the Patriotic People’s Front in 1954, definitely pointed in this direction.20  
Khrushchev’s intentions remain unclear, even in hindsight, but we might try to risk a few 
conclusions regarding the question of why Hungary was the only country that Moscow 
radically intervened in, in 1953. For one thing, Hungary was less significant strategically to 
the USSR than Czechoslovakia or Poland. (Soviet forces were still stationed in Austria at this 
time.) For another, the Hungarian communist leadership emulated the Stalinist model more 
closely and more ardently than any other country in the region, completely ignoring the 
country’s natural endowments and the needs of the populace. Thus, since there was no hope 
of evolutionary development it had to intervene directly, for the events in Plzen and East 
Berlin were a warning. The Kremlin’s goal was to maintain social stability and it was 
justifiably concerned about Hungary repeating the insurgencies in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. At the same time, by setting up a dual structure (party and government) 
Rákosi had the opportunity to pull back on the reins of government from time to time, if the 
country was thought to be galloping forward too freely. 
Nagy’s “new phase” policy came to an end in early 1955, at about the same time the 
Czechoslovak “new phase” policy was halted. The difference in the endings was essentially 
the same as the one under which they began. In Hungary the end came following direct 
Soviet intervention while in Czechoslovakia it was concluded as the result of an autonomous 
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initiative. On January 8, much the same as in June 1953, the Hungarian leadership was 
ordered to Moscow and Khrushchev severely criticized Nagy. Mikhail Suslov was present at 
the March 2-4 meeting of the Hungarian Working People’s Party Central Committee to exert 
the USSR’s will and András Hegedüs took over Imre Nagy’s post. At the April 14 Central 
Committee meeting the Stalinist forces went further than this, stripping Nagy of all his party 
functions. The resolution stated that Nagy’s “anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist and anti-party views 
formed an interconnected system” and that in attaining his goals he had “applied methods 
foreign to the party and opposed to the party that were even divisive.” 21 I should add that 
this last move was done by Rákosi on his own and not in response to any Soviet initiative. 
But the overall Soviet intervention was unable to halt the social flows, for almost 
simultaneously with Nagy’s ouster came the formation of the Petőfi Circle of the Union of 
Working Youth which quickly became the voice of the reformers. Khrushchev meanwhile 
was unable to be consistent. He did not connect the dots, did not see the relationship between 
events in the different countries, and did not see how they would affect the leaderships of 
other countries. Shortly after Rákosi regained his dominant position, Khrushchev travelled to 
Yugoslavia to reconcile with Tito. Termed the “Walk to Canossa” by insiders, the CPSU 
recognized every country’s right to choose its own road to socialism. That instantly limited 
Rákosi’s own maneuverability and Nagy, feeling himself justified, not only failed to exercise 
the requisite self-criticism but increasingly analyzed his “new phase” policy including its 
shortcomings and the tasks still to be completed. Nagy’s theoretical writings of 1955 and 
1956 criticized Stalinism with increasingly severity.
22
 
Poland had no need of Soviet intervention as radical as the Hungarian version. The 
reasons lay in the specifics of “Polish Stalinism,” and in what led up to it. Poland – as 
opposed to the other countries of the region – did not experience peace at the end of World 
War II with peace but underwent a period of civil war or partisan warfare. The fighting went 
on there from 1944 to 1949. It is estimated that during this time the courts issued verdicts in 
55,000 political cases, and about 10,000 of these were sentences of capital punishment. In 
addition to that the fighting claimed somewhere between 8,000 and 10,000 lives. To 
compound the situation, in 1944-1945 no fewer than 40,000 members of the Polish Home 
Army were interned in the Soviet Union.
23
 With this in the background,
24
 when the turnabout 
came in 1948, the Stalinization of the Polish state and economy meant that years of peace 
had finally come to a country where the populace was exhausted by the fighting and the 
constant fear for their lives. In other words, Stalinism (1948-1954) in Poland did not cause 
the social upheaval that it did in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. And then of course, the fact 
that the Polish leaders “sabotaged” implementation of a total Soviet-type dictatorship every 
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chance they got also played a role.
25
 And one other reason: Bolesław Bierut counted as a 
weakling compared to Rákosi and Gottwald and Stalin did not make any particular demands 
on Poland. Typical of the situation was that Władysław Gomułka, the foremost advocate of a 
special Polish road to socialism was criticized and expelled from the party, but he was not 
subject a show trial although he was imprisoned. This was despite the fact that on April 5, 
1948, the foreign affairs section of the CPSU wrote a study called “On the position regarding 
the anti-Marxist ideology of the leaders of the Polish Workers’ Party.” That study sharply 
criticized Gomułka’s views and through him it criticized all of Polish Marxism, alleging that 
it had “broken away from the teachings of Lenin and Stalin and the ideological and 
theoretical treasures of the Bolshevik Party.”26 In particular, the Soviets criticized the 
theorem that evolution in Poland was possible through a people’s democracy, meaning that it 
would be possible to achieve socialism without requiring a dictatorship of the proletariat.
27
 
Up to this point the Polish concept was not particularly different from the Czechoslovak one. 
The significant difference however was in the fact that the CPC had essentially achieved that 
goal and then adjusted to Soviet expectations, while amidst Polish conditions the theory 
didn’t appear to stand much of a chance of implementation. To make things worse for 
Poland, Gomułka did not resort to self-criticism. Polish nationalism – much like the 
Hungarian version – looked to be far more dangerous than the Czechoslovak version in 
Moscow’s eyes, since the latter did not include anti-Sovietism. 
In Poland, the first signs of the “Thaw” appeared in 1954. Censorship was gradually 
limited and criticism – very mild – of the operations of government bodies appeared in the 
media. An amnesty was announced under which some of the people imprisoned for political 
“crimes” were released. The collectivization process slowed. The first intellectual debate 
circles were formed and ideological pressure on culture (mainly on literature and films) was 
reduced, allowing a distancing from the dogma of socialist realism (socrealism). 
At this time an unexpected event handed ammunition to the advocates of de-
Stalinization. A leading functionary in the state security agency, Józef Światło, defected to 
the West and starting in August 1954, the Polish language broadcasts of Radio Free Europe 
began reporting on the excesses and crimes of the Stalinist regime. 
28
 The immediate 
outcome was the reorganization of the state security bodies, but far more important was the 
impact on Polish society, which included party members. A growing circle of protesters 
demanded an end to the privileges of state security agency and party functionaries, an 
investigation of unlawful acts and the rehabilitation of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa). 
Between November 29 and December 1, 1954 an extended plenary session of the Central 
Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) was held. Initially planned to last 
half a day, it went on for three entire days. In that time 35 of the 170 participants took the 
floor and the sharp criticism of the activists surprised even the party leadership. At Bierut’s 
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request, every speaker was asked to authorize his/her own text which the Central Committee 
then sent to the first secretaries of the Vojvodship party committees. The goal of the 
Politburo was to lower the tension created by Światło’s defection.29 Following the Central 
Committee meeting, on December 13, even Gomułka was released. 
By the summer of 1955 events were clearly moving forward under the sign of the 
political thaw. A poem by Adam Ważyk called “Poem for adults (Poemat dla dorosłych)” 
was published in Nowa Kultura on August 19. The appearance of this poem by the one-time 
Stalinist poet was the first important event in Poland’s thaw, and became the icon of 
literature. The poem started a nationwide debate and contributed to the success of the 
political thaw. At this same time, Polish youth became active. Debates began within the 
Union of Polish Youth (ZMP), which had been established along the lines of the Soviet 
Komsomol. In the autumn of 1955 the ZMP paper, Po Prostu, changed its profile and 
became the weekly for “students and young intellectuals.” Later, during the events of 
October 1956, it became the voice of the reform. 
The common features of the “new phases” are that they ran in transitional (1953-1955) 
periods of international détente and that none of the leaders in power in any country 
questioned the Stalin-type centrally planned command economies or the ownership relations 
in which the state was dominant. None questioned the political structure based on the 
monopoly of a single party. However, these were not the “new phase” objectives. The 
question of “the model” had not yet come up. As far as the models were concerned, there 
appeared to be two alternatives. One was the socialism model evolved by Stalin in the Soviet 
Union. Typical of this model was the bureaucratic government collectivization of private and 
societal property in which the basis for community existence was state mediation. This was 
contrasted with the “now legitimate” Yugoslav model of self-administration based on state 
and community ownership. At this time however, not one of the leading politicians raised the 
idea of implementing the latter.
30
 Not even Imre Nagy’s concept of the “new phase” 
contained any new strategic tasks. The goal remained “laying the economic foundations for 
socialism and building socialism” while “changing and correcting previous erroneous 
tactics.” The “new phase” was not of “socialism,” in other words, it was not concerned with a 
specific form of socialism, merely with modifications in the road leading to socialism. It was 
not a new model, only a choice of roads.
31
 In the language of the Marxian categories of the 
time: was a dictatorship of the proletariat necessary to achieve socialism or could it be 
attained through evolution, without requiring a dictatorship of the proletariat? 
32
 The new 
tactics pointed towards the latter. 
In all three countries discussed, the “new tactics” changed economic policy priorities, 
meaning that the proportion of industrial investments was reduced and funding for 
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agriculture was increased. In all three countries the institution of the personality cult was 
terminated (it never reached fruition in Poland) and all moved towards collective leadership. 
Czechoslovakia had a dual leadership structure for several months while Hungary’s lasted for 
nearly two years. In the former country the rivalry was between the president and party first 
secretary while in Hungary it was between the prime minister and the party’s first secretary. 
Both countries had abandoned the exercise of power through the terror of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and gradually terminated the open coercive class struggle against the “kulaks.” 
Although the collectivization of agriculture remained a priority in all countries – for reasons 
of both principle and economics – during this period they did not force implementation. All 
of them declared at least partial amnesties for political prisoners and began rehabilitation. 
In other words, the “new phase” was a correction in past political practices and in the 
final analysis – although not deliberately – it opened the way to discourses on the roads and 
modes of building socialism. At stake was not merely choosing the road to socialism but also 
creating acceptance for socialism. The question was not just how to build socialism in a 
given country but, with a system and power structure inherited from Stalinism, it also 
concerned how the given country should continue to develop while keeping one eye on 
serving national interests.  In all three countries the greatest merit of the “new phase” was 
that it made it increasingly possible to deviate from the classic era of Stalinism and think, 
debate, and write about alternatives. Economics, philosophy, and literature were again given 
a voice in public affairs, and the cinematic and fine arts were allowed to shake off Zhdanov’s 
socialist realism, allowing subjects, language and mode of expression to become pluralistic. 
Imbedded in this process was the debate on the model – what would socialism look like in 
the various countries.  
 
From the CPSU’s 20th Congress to the dispute over models (1956-1958) 
 
In all countries the policies of the “new phase” domestic needs were the primary trigger 
for two factors: détente in world politics and a change in Moscow’s policy towards its allies. 
Nonetheless, there was no connection between the “new phases” in Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
and Hungary. The party leaders did not use one another as models. Instead, the new 
guidelines were strongly based on what went on in the Moscow-Prague, Moscow-Warsaw, 
and Moscow-Budapest relationships as outcomes of major or minor Soviet interventions. The 
depth of the new guidelines and the implementation methods were strongly dependent on the 
national specifics of the systems that took shape in the given country. 
The 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956 gave de-Stalinization a harder push. It 
marked a phase boundary in that it was when the CPSU took an official position on the 
matter at the highest party forum.  Earlier bilateral talks, held in secret, now gave way to 
public debate in which the Soviet leadership confirmed the guideline already known as the 
“new phase,” and the doctrine of “peaceful coexistence.”33 However, the congress also heard 
Khrushchev’s “secret” speech, one that only the congress delegates and the new Central 
Committee members were allowed to hear.
34
 Prior to their departure the communist party 
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leaders who were in power in their own countries received copies of the speech. However, 
shortly afterwards, the Soviet party leadership decided to allow all party and Komsomol 
members to find out what was in it. Khrushchev harshly attacked Stalin’s person and politics, 
not only for the personality cult and the role he played in the terror, but also for alleged errors 
he made during the world war. At the same time, he was careful to defend the Soviet system, 
in which he always cited Lenin. His critique was exclusively focused on Stalin’s crimes and 
he was also careful to speak only of communist victims. Khrushchev had a number of 
reasons that may have been behind his decision to present this list of crimes. On the domestic 
front, most probably he wanted this rehabilitation to hurt and disgrace those of his opponents 
that could be linked to Stalin (such as Malenkov), while his move may also have been 
preventive – better for him to make the exposure than anyone else – since this assured that he 
would not be accused as an accessory. Finally, he also recognized that Stalin’s repression had 
reached such proportions that it could not be kept “secret” from society (mainly from the 
party apparatus). So, it had to be spoken of “openly.”35 Khrushchev’s ultimate goal was to 
help the communist movement in an ideological rejuvenation, meaning to open a new page in 
the history of the CPSU and in its relationships with all the other communist parties. As far 
as the latter goal was concerned, exactly the opposite happened. The secret speech led to a 
serious ideological and political crisis within the socialist camp, offering a huge amount of 
ammunition to critics of Stalinist-type regimes. In addition, the USSR’s prestige was badly 
shaken and Moscow’s credibility suffered a major setback. The speech also had an indirect 
impact: the harsh criticism of Stalin’s deeds offered the various other countries an 
opportunity to review their own experience in building socialism along Soviet lines. Closely 
connected to this, the speech contributed to many intellectuals having become disillusioned 
with Marxism-Leninism. A growing number voiced their critique of the political systems 
built upon these principles and many others broke with communism completely.
36
 
Criticism of Stalinism gained momentum in all socialist countries. In March, plenary 
sessions of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People’s Party (HWPP) (March 
12-13) and of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (March 29-30) 
held debates on the afterlife of the 20th Congress. Both parties’ leaderships verbally recited 
the lessons, but really chose to wait until it blew over.
37
 The situation in Poland was more 
complicated since Bolesław Bierut died while still in Moscow. In the presence of 
Khrushchev, who arrived in Warsaw for the funeral, Edward Ochab was chosen as the new 
party leader. In the meantime debate over Khrushchev’s secret speech was sharp and 
nationwide.
38
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All this meant was that history had moved past the moderate policy changes of the pre-
1956 “new phase.” Under the changed conditions the question appeared as whether or not to 
maintain and follow the principles of the Stalin brand of state socialism, Marxism-Leninism, 
and proletarian internationalism that up till then had been set in stone. And if the answer was 
“no”, then what? From the spring of 1956 public life in Czechoslovakia, but even more so in 
Poland and Hungary, was heated with these arguments. Then towards the end of 1956 
Yugoslavia joined in, seeing itself validated. Events of 1956 and 1957 differed from earlier 
ones in that the center of gravity had shifted. Until them Moscow had set the tone of events 
and the impact of one socialist country on another had been negligible. At this time 
horizontal effects kicked in and in many cases influenced foreign and domestic policy flows 
in the region. The socialist bloc was turned into a real bloc at this time and through these 
debates, since Moscow was no longer the one setting the tone. Conclusions evolved through 
the interactions of the cross-fire within the camp. 
From the aspect of the communist parties, Czechoslovakia was in the best position. 
There the agenda did not involve a change in leadership. After Gottwald died in 1953, 
Novotný took over as head of the party and in time was trusted by Khrushchev. The “new 
phase” policies and the country’s comparative economic advantage – the industry it inherited 
was advanced – allowed it to dampen public dissatisfaction after the Plzen strikes of 1953 
were broken. Between 1953 and 1956 consumer prices were reduced six times, by a total of 
18 percent, and many steps were taken to accelerate housing construction and raise salaries 
while also reinforcing the positions of Slovak national institutions and councils. 
Czechoslovak policy was so successful that in 1956 social dissatisfaction really was lower 
than in Poland or Hungary. 
39
 On October 24, 1956, when Novotný travelled to Moscow for 
official talks, Khrushchev set Czechoslovakia’s economic policy before the other socialist 
countries as an example.
40
 While overall that was the situation, the 20th Congress of the 
CPSU did shake up Czechoslovak party and social life. Khrushchev’s secret speech shattered 
its peace and quiet. On March 29-30, 1956 the party’s Central Committee discussed the 
lessons of the congress, and the party’s leadership criticized its own past actions (self-
criticism), albeit mildly. The debate continued at the next Central Committee meeting (April 
19-20) with forty-four people asking for the floor. A resolution adopted then concluded that 
the critique had reached a level that was damaging to the party. Alexej Čepička, who had 
been a deputy prime minister, minister of national defense, a member of the Politburo and a 
secretary of the Central Committee, was stripped of all his positions. Finally, the Central 
Committee wrote a letter to the Writer’s Union, to be read at its forthcoming congress, 
calling on the writers to moderate themselves.
41
 By the end of March, not only were the 
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writers discussing Stalin’s “personality cult,” but so were the unions, and various youth 
forums also kept it on their agendas and took the initiative in the tone of debates. Critical 
voices became increasingly loud within the CPC cells and a growing number of people began 
calling for a special party congress.
42
 
The Czechoslovak Writers’ Union held its second congress on April 22-29, 1956, an 
event that became a milestone in the process of Czechoslovak de-Stalinization.
43
 The writers 
did not put forward any overt political demands. They remained within the framework of 
literature, but they sharply criticized schematic socialist realism and censorship. A proposal 
by two young authors, the Slovak Domiik Tatarka and the Czech Milan Kundera demanded 
the rehabilitation of Ladislav Novomeský, who was imprisoned on changes of “bourgeois 
nationalism.”  Although the writers’ union paper (Literární Noviny) carried the speeches, the 
event was not followed up by any major social action. Student May Day protests, on May 12 
in Bratislava and May 19 in Prague, did not turn into anti-Stalinism demonstrations. The 
protests and parades were held in a light-hearted atmosphere and although several demands 
were made, they did not touch on the basics of the system. The student initiatives did not 
arouse any interest on the part of either the intellectuals of the blue-collar workers, and 
neither group of potential militants joined up with them.
44
 
Truth be told, the CPC got the upper hand with comparative ease. On June 11-15, 1956 
they held the nationwide party conference many had been demanding. There, both Novotný 
and Zápotocký underlined the importance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU while defending 
the party line set down by the 10th congress of the CPC in 1954. “The facts clearly show us 
that those guidelines were correct and are still correct, that we do not need to change 
anything and that we have in fact implemented them correctly and successfully.” According 
to Novotný, acceptance of the achievements of the 20th Congress “does not mean they are a 
ready-to-use set of instructions for resolving all of our problems,” and that the issues related 
to building socialist society need to be worked out in keeping with our own circumstances. In 
essence this was completely in line with the long-standing policy of the CPC, the policy of 
the “Czechoslovak road.”45 Regarding the Slánský trial, he continued to insist that the 
charges rested on facts. Although the Soviet Union had not set out to review any of its own 
show trials, Khrushchev continued to treat the elimination of the Trotskyites and Bukharin as 
points in Stalin’s favor. The only charges Novotný acknowledged as false were the ones 
leveled against the Yugoslavs, and that was in keeping with the Soviet line. 
In the final analysis, despite the rapid consolidation of the Czechoslovak party Moscow 
believed that things had happened there and that Stalinism was out. Moscow considered the 
CPC’s policies exemplary. The CPC visited Moscow from January 29 to 31, 1957, and that 
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was followed by an official return visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev on July 9-16. The 
Czechoslovak leaders took the Soviets on a tour of the country that included Prague, 
Bratislava, Košice, Brno, Ostrava, Plzen, Most, Žilina, and Olomouc. This was Khrushchev’s 
first official visit to the East European region following the storm-filled October. 
Communiqués issued on the two visits wrote of identical views and that the CPC guaranteed 
Khrushchev its full support.
46
 
The situation was more heated in Poland. The strikes in Poznan that evolved into 
workers’ uprisings in June were beaten into submission by the Polish army. Ochab took a 
leading role in combating the workers but he was unable to halt elections.
47
 Real change 
came in October 1956. The 7th plenary session of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) 
gave in to social pressure and pressure from the reformist wing of the party and chose 
Władysław Gomułka as party first secretary. Gomułka had been the number one advocate for 
a unique Polish road to socialism. The anti-Stalinist speech he gave to the meeting contained 
critique of Stalin’s methods of exercising power, specifically of his coercive collectivization 
of agriculture and accelerated industrialization.
48
 This address was closely related to the 
policy voiced by Imre Nagy when talking of the “new phase” although it was far more 
explicit (after all, this was after the 20th Congress!), and it offered many the hope of real 
change. Gomułka’s speech not only raised high hopes in Poland but also acted as a catalyst 
among Hungarian college students and intellectuals, precisely because they saw it as related 
to Nagy’s political line. To a certain degree, Polish and Hungarian events had been moving 
side by side since the 20th Congress. In both countries the intellectuals were far more reform-
minded than in Czechoslovakia, demanding real reforms in politics, economics, and culture. 
The debates of the Petőfi Circle organized by the Union of Working Youth in Hungary, 
particularly those centering on economics and philosophy, were closely related to the articles 
and studies in the Polish media, and even to the programs organized by Warsaw’s Klub 
Krzywego Koła ("Club of the Crooked Circle") that was underway in early 1956. They also 
resembled the attitudes of the 2nd conference of economists. 
49
 Szabad Nép carried 
Gomułka’s harsh anti-Stalinist speech at the October plenary session in its entirety. The 
outcome was that the Budapest youth demanded changes similar to the Polish ones on 
October 23. They demanded a place in government for Imre Nagy. Nagy’s personal history 
was not even similar to Gomułka’s but there were many common features in the policies they 
advocated. In the days to come it was of utmost significance that Ochab had resigned as party 
leader and that the Polish Stalinists had not tried to prevent Gomułka’s ascendance, and that 
they did not call on the Soviet Union to prevent the move. So, the new Polish leader took the 
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helm of the party with a comparatively high level of social support without his potential 
enemies going against him in open battle.  The outcome was that Khrushchev also accepted 
it.
50
 In contrast, Nagy came to head the government under very difficult circumstances, 
having to fight not only against the Stalinists (headed by Ernő Gerő) but also against the 
populace, who had become radicalized on the street. 
The crushing of the Hungarian uprising (November 4) brought about an extremely 
complicated and labyrinthine political situation. The heads of all involved countries 
(Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and now Yugoslavia) faced the serious 
dilemma of where to go from here. Could de-Stalinization be continued? If so, along what 
road and employing what methods? The October events clearly demonstrated the limits to 
possible changes to all party leaders, teaching them that unless events were under satisfactory 
control the “cause of socialism” could be put at risk. The Hungarian uprising pointed to the 
painful truth that their regimes could be easily toppled (in just a few days) unless the Soviet 
Union came to their defense. The overall problem returned the issue of their relationship to 
the Soviet Union and sovereignty to the agenda. Events had had also made it clear that 
questioning basic principles such as the dictatorship of the proletariat (the leading role of the 
party) and proletarian internationalism (responsibility for the existence of the whole socialist 
camp) were at the essence of many other issues. These included the possibility that self-
administration by the workers, a decentralized economy, and a market and the like within the 
umbrella of socialism, could prepare the terrain for enemies of the system and in the final 
analysis could trigger “counter-revolution.” The vulnerability of the system and of the power 
controlling it provided a new framework for the fight between the Stalinists (dogmatists) and 
the reformers (revisionists) in these countries. 
The situation was made even more complicated by the fact that Poland’s new leadership 
had announced a real turnabout in October. It swore to reduce dependency on the Soviet 
Union first of all, and to evolve a partnership of equals. Meanwhile, Yugoslavia, shortly after 
the defeat of the Hungarian uprising, initiated a debate with the Soviet Union.  Answers were 
needed to both challenges while consolidating the Hungarian and Polish situations and, if 
possible, not allowing the unity of the socialist camp to be upset. 
Gomułka insisted on sticking to the statement made by the Soviet government on 
October 30, 1956, in which Moscow said that “reciprocal relations could only be based on 
the principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, government independence 
and sovereignty, and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.” 51 Poland in return, 
came forward with proposals regarding both the Warsaw Pact and COMECON that would 
have weakened the internal cohesion of the socialist camp. The Polish aspiration, visible 
from the autumn of 1956, was to relax its dependency not only on the Soviet Union but on 
the entire socialist camp, which in perspective, threatened to undermine the unified and 
powerful socialist world and weaken Khrushchev’s goal of having the Warsaw Pact 
recognized as equal to NATO. Therefore, in November 1956 Warsaw proposed a revamping 
of the Warsaw Pact that, if accepted, would have limited true cooperation within the alliance 
to actual war. (The proposal suggested that there be no joint armed forces, that every army be 
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subordinated to its own staff and that there be a Military Advisory Body alongside the chiefs 
of staff, the former of which would include the defense ministers and chiefs of staff of every 
single member.)
52
 
As far as the economic integration of the socialist camp was concerned, the Poles 
submitted a proposal in April 1957 which hinted at an illusionary alliance. This draft would 
have reduced planning to issues of energy and transportation and an information exchange. 
They also wanted to remove coordination control from the authority of the COMECON 
secretariat which was under Soviet influence.
53
 
Both Polish proposals were rejected by the other members although at least they 
discussed the COMECON proposals.  Poland’s ideas were less than timely in that particular 
international environment, which really wanted to tighten up integration. Poland’s ideas 
would have loosened it instead. 
There was another aspect of Polish policies that would not have encouraged unity. Tito’s 
foreign policy autonomy was the model Gomułka aspired to emulate and to this end he 
sought contact with Belgrade. To Warsaw it was important that aside from the Chinese, only 
Yugoslavia’s leadership swallowed its October shakeup without comment, and which did not 
consider it a danger to the socialist system. Yugoslavia’s party leadership and society were 
pleased with the October decisions of the PUWP Central Committee. The Communist Party 
of Yugoslavia was the only one which published a separate brochure containing the main 
reports and decisions of the Polish party’s 8th plenary session, issuing it in 2,000 copies. 
Yugoslavia was also the only socialist country to assure Poland of its support in Polish-
American economic negotiations.
54
 Another point worth remembering is that Tito and 
Gomułka took similar although not identical positions on the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and 
the Soviet military intervention. On October 29, both parties sent messages to the Hungarian 
party, assuring it of their support. Tito expressed a real hope that events in Hungary and 
Poland would be concluded with a “Yugoslav resolution.”  This was true even if both Tito 
and Gomułka accepted the necessity of the Soviet intervention because the cause of socialism 
was at risk.
55
 
They did not agree, however on what had triggered the crisis, or what was the reason for 
the uprising, issues that touched on the essence of the system. The Yugoslavs argued that it 
was not only the Rákosi-Gerő clique but also failures of the entire bureaucratic system.56 
They argued that the 20th Congress had simplified the main problems by blaming them on 
the personality cult. In Hungary’s case, they said, it is not enough to speak of the Rákosi-
Gerő combo since the entire system, weighted down by bureaucracy, was to blame. The 
Yugoslav leaders set their own system of worker self-administration in contrast with the 
Stalin-type of bureaucratic state socialism. That argument ended up turning a fight against 
revisionism into a new anti-Yugoslav platform.  Gomułka, despite his solidarity with Tito, 
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did not take Belgrade’s side in the dispute over system types.57 One reason for his silence 
was that in early 1957 he faced his biggest challenge to date, parliamentary elections. At 
stake was verifying the legitimacy of the new political leadership. His main task was to 
stabilize his power and to restore the regime to a degree. The worker self-governments 
established in the autumn of 1956 were becoming very uncomfortable for the PUWP 
leadership.
58
 
Initially, the system debate initiated by the Yugoslavs was widely supported among 
intellectuals in Hungary and Poland. Until early December 1956, Népszabadság carried all 
significant positions on both sides.
59
 Workers’ Councils were being established in both 
countries since October and these bodies of self-administration were a true power alternative 
to the parties. In Hungary they only lasted until the end of the year, but in Poland they 
remained standing until the end of 1958. In Hungary, however, the October events were re-
evaluated. It was officially determined that the Rákosi-Gerő clique had made mistakes but 
Nagy and his fellows had committed treason. That short-circuited the debate on the various 
systems, condemned all forms of revisionism, and sealed the fates of the workers’ councils. 
Within this framework of interpretation, the idea of questioning the leading role of the party, 
or pulling the country out of the socialist camp was charged with being the talking points of a 
liquidator policy, a concrete historical example of how revisionism led to counter-revolution.  
However, given the disastrous state of the Hungarian economy, the Kádár administration 
decided that the system of economic control and management had to be changed. A working 
committee was established under the leadership of István Varga, a onetime Smallholder Party 
economics professor, to design the new guidelines. A significant portion of the economists 
and related intellectuals approved of the Yugoslav model of self-administration. Eventually, 
Kádár gave up on the idea of economic reform, having come to agreement with the Soviets 
on two important issues in March 1957. One was his agreement to try Imre Nagy and 
accomplices as traitors. That effectively ended the issue of revisionism and of exploring the 
Yugoslav model. The second was that the Soviets offered a sufficient amount of economic 
assistance to temporarily remedy the problems of the Hungarian economy.
60
 
The situation was much the same in Poland, not counting the major differences that the 
workers’ councils there were still in operation, had attained strong positions, and had the 
active support of the Polish intellectuals. Most of both the workers and the economist-
philosopher intellectuals strongly supported the Yugoslav self-government model and would 
have liked to see a similar system. By April 1957 it was clear even to Gomułka that his 
efforts to relax the bonds of the socialist camp both regarding the Warsaw Pact and 
COMECON would be rejected. A major point against him was that Poland had no allies 
                                                 
57
 Compare with Gomułka’s address on November 29, 1956. Trybuna Ludu, November 30, 1956. 
58
 On February 26, 1957, Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz issued a platform declaration after the 
elections which rejected the idea of completely introducing worker and enterprise self-administration. “I think it 
important to emphasize that the concepts aimed at eliminating central planning and giving an enterprise total 
freedom over managing the national wealth while making the state take the risk is not only completely opposed 
to the principles of socialism but also exerts a negative effect on living standards and the entire economic 
system.” Trybuna Ludu, February 27, 1957. 
59
 After the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP) took a position on December 5, the reporting stopped, 
and not even extracts of Kardelj’s December 7 address were published. 
60
 See: Baráth Magdolna: Magyarország és a Szovjetunió. In: Ed.: Rainer M. János. “Hatvanas évek” 
Magyarországon. Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, 2004, 37–42. 
19 
 
within the camp. He had been unable to normalize relations with either East Germany
61
 or 
Czechoslovakia since October of 1956.
62
 
He was unable to evolve closer relations with Hungary because of pressure from the 
Polish public.
63
 The ambivalent relationship with Tito could not counterbalance good 
relations within the socialist camp, all the more so as Gomułka’s main foreign policy priority 
was to get the western border of his country recognized. The country best able to guarantee 
that this would come about was the Soviet Union, not Yugoslavia. Aside from his realistic 
concern that he could become isolated within the camp, Gomułka was pushed to condemn 
revisionism by the mistrust a significant portion of the PUWP members had for the new 
leadership, even though Gomułka had not initiated a witch hunt against the one-time 
Stalinists.
64
 
Hit by any number of external and internal forces, Gomułka finally gave in and at the 9th 
plenary session of the PUWP Central Committee (May 15-18, 1957) he sharply criticized the 
intellectuals and journalists who were demanding “a second phase of October reforms.” He 
lambasted dogmatism inside the party but said it was less dangerous than revisionism, 
charging that the latter undermined the leading role and unity of the party.
65
 That meeting put 
an end to “October hopes.” Much as Kádár had done, Gomułka also abandoned the idea of a 
Polish model of economic management even though a committee headed by the pro-
Yugoslav professor of economics Czesław Bobrowski had already submitted a proposal.  It 
was a sign of the change in political flows that neither Trybuna Ludu, the Central 
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Committee’s daily, nor Nowe Drogi, the party’s theoretical monthly published the proposal, 
allowing it only into print in a Warsaw paper read by a very limited group of readers.
66
 
Yugoslavia criticized Gomułka’s turnabout. Poland’s leaders nonetheless wanted to 
maintain its good relationship with Belgrade, although chances were dim. On September 16, 
1957, Gomułka and Tito issued a joint statement on “various roads leading to socialism,” 
albeit, Warsaw no longer mentioned any “separate road.”  Prior to the October Central 
Committee plenary session it banned Po Prostu, which had counted as the voice of the 
revisionists. Then the plenary session passed a resolution on re-examining party membership, 
the result of which was that that the PUWP rid itself of nearly 300,000 members. 
On the whole, Kádár’s evaluation of events in Poland was accurate. He first met with 
Gomułka at a meeting in Moscow in November 1957. Kádár reported the meeting as follows: 
“Gomułka himself would like to strengthen the positions of socialism. However, his tactics in 
this effort are almost the opposite of what we are doing….Most likely, given time, say one or 
two years, our positions will be quite similar to one another, or at least that is what the course 
of development looks like it will be.”67 
In post-1956 Czechoslovakia, the CPC leadership focused comfortably on fighting 
revisionism. For one thing, it had no serious problem with the workers’ councils since after 
1945 the CPC had built up very powerful positions within the trade unions.  Loyal unions 
played a significant role in mobilizing the populace for the communist party, including the 
period of the takeover in February 1948. At the same time, the Czechoslovak leaders viewed 
Poland as chauvinist and anti-Czech and also as ideologically deviant. Their position on 
Hungary was similar although the negative stereotypes regarding the Hungarians were 
particularly strong among the Slovaks. During the time of the Hungarian uprising in October, 
Slovak society was strongly concerned – and the propaganda machine played on these 
feelings to the utmost – that a neutral Hungary would be a threat to Czechoslovakia.68 So, it 
was to be expected that the CPC leadership in both Prague and Bratislava were very much 
against the Polish and Hungarian changes from the outset. On the day immediately following 
the start of the Hungarian uprising they mobilized their own internal forces and on October 
25 they had already decided to militarily reinforce their entire border with Hungary.
69
 A 
media campaign opposing the uprising also got underway. There was no doubt that the heads 
of the CPC were ready to support the Kádár government established after the uprising was 
crushed.  The Czechoslovak leadership, which had treated the revolt as a counter-revolution 
from the outset, had no problem connecting revisionism and counter-revolution and 
condemning it. One reason this was so easy for them was because there were no domestic 
forces pressuring them to act any differently. The philosophical flow of revisionism never 
appeared in Czechoslovakia with the force found in Poland or Hungary.
70
 It also lacked the 
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economist-intellectuals able to seriously review the existing system.
71
 In other words, the 
legacy of Stalinism made it possible for the CPC to participate in the fight against 
revisionism without any risk to itself. Thus, Prague was the first to voice its agreement in 
principle with the December 1956 resolutions of the new Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party 
(HSWP) and it did so without reservations.
72
 
Initially, the CPC responded to the system debate initiated by Yugoslavia with discreet 
criticism,
73
 but then it sharply attacked it. After the 7th Congress of the Yugoslav communist 
party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia – LCY),74 the editorials in Rudé Pravo were 
much sharper in tone. They wrote: “There is only one Marxism-Leninism. Scientific 
socialism would not be internationally valid if it were distorted through the arbitrary and 
spontaneous addition of nationally determined factors.”75 While Moscow was pleased with 
this position, neither the Hungarian nor the Polish party voiced anything so specific. Poland’s 
Trybuna Ludu specifically avoided any evaluation of the domestic policy aspects of the 
Yugoslav party’s platform. “We limit ourselves exclusively to matters of an international 
nature since we believe that the Yugoslav communists have the greatest authority insofar as 
Yugoslavia’s domestic issues are concerned,” it wrote. In complete opposition to the 
evaluation in Rudé Pravo, Trybuna Ludu’s editors wrote: “The Yugoslav communists have 
emphasized that every country had to build socialism in accordance with the specific 
conditions in their own country. This is correct.” 76  Népszabadság carried the position of the 
HSWP in its May 21, 1958 issue.
77
 The significance of this article grew when Pravda re-
published the entire article. The Hungarian paper criticized the LCY for failing to coordinate 
with the other parties, for not listening to “comradely critique,” and for adopting a platform 
containing numerous “anti-Marxist elements” and errors. It also unequivocally rejected 
Yugoslavia’s critique of the socialist camp (particularly the claims regarding it being made 
up of “bureaucratic statist countries,” and those regarding sovereignty). But it did not qualify 
the entire LCY platform as being revisionist as, for instance, the Chinese had done, limiting 
that term to specific parts, particularly the internationally oriented ones. It is important that 
the article called Yugoslavia a country that is part of the socialist world system, and while it 
was not a part of the socialist camp there could be no doubt that it was building socialism. 
“The LCY is the party leading the building of socialism in Yugoslavia, even though it was 
making mistakes.” This statement recognized the “separate roads,” albeit it, indirectly. 
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The forerunners to this duality were visible as early as June 1957 when a coup against 
Khrushchev was organized but failed. The expulsion of the conservatives (Malenkov, 
Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov and Shepilov ) from the Politburo was a sign 
that de-Stalinization was underway in practice and was halted only on the ideological plane – 
since it affected the “model dispute.” That was behind the failure of the system dispute 
initiated by the Yugoslavs.  The Soviet model of socialism became the one designated for the 
East European socialist countries to follow although they no longer had to copy the Soviet 
examples in implementation. This was officially stated at a Moscow meeting of communist 
and workers’ parties in November 1957. There they re-confirmed the principles of “complete 
equality, territorial integrity, national independence and respect for sovereignty, and non-
interference in the internal affairs of others,” and at the same time concluded that there 
always were objective features in the building of socialism that “must unquestionably be 
considered,” as well as “specifics and national traditions,” and historically evolved 
differences.
78
 The “objective features” in the declaration reflected the essence of the Soviet 
model, but the document clearly allowed the use of forms that differed from the Soviet 
dictatorship of the proletariat while prohibiting “the mechanical copying of the politics and 
tactics of the communist parties of other countries.”  This could be interpreted as a ban on 
copying either the Soviet or the Yugoslav models but it was really directed towards 
Yugoslavia. That was strongly suggested by declaring deviation from the “basic principles of 
general Marxism-Leninism” to be a serious error, and citing revisionism as the main hazard. 
The reformist-revisionist camp in Poland was quite enthusiastic since the October 
changes offered temporary hopes that the new policies would be introduced. But it was clear 
that the debate generated by the Yugoslavs had the opposite effect. In the final analysis, it 
even forced Gomułka into the anti-reform camp. The system debate was shelved and after 
1958 the groups that critiqued the model of state socialism were, in effect, marginalized or 
become opposition. In the more fortunate cases their representatives were allowed to 
continue their careers as university instructors or in research institutes. Revisionism was no 
longer considered an internal affair that could be argued between the party and its opposition. 
Following a temporary “freeze” the debate was “warmed up” again in all three countries 
in the early 1960s, but that is another story. The major achievement of the first wave of de-
Stalinization was that it became possible to build socialism without the Soviet form of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, while the major loss was that the debate on systems failed.    
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